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Abstract: The following report provides an in-depth and empirically focused overview of 
collective mobilization before, during and after the breakdown of the Tunisian authoritarian 
regime in  2010-11.  It  focuses  on the  relation  between changing (political)  contexts  and 
dynamics within Tunisian collective mobilization concerning the peaceful character of the 
protests, the use of modern media tools, the language of human rights, the role of students, 
labor  organizations,  and  the  Islamists.  The  report  provides  a  detailed  overview  of  the 
historical and structural background of the uprising and eventual revolution.  It discusses 
resulting (political) opportunities for social mobilization; provides an overview of key actors 
and – eventually – gives a detailed overview of actual protest events taking place throughout 
this period. 
It is argued that existing student, labor and “democratization” movements in Tunisia 
did not initiate protests, but did provide crucial existing structures for protests to endure and 
spread. The movements themselves were therefore not at the inception of the uprising, but 
were  crucial  in  shaping  it.   Second,  it  is  argued  that  so-called  “political  opportunity 
structures” were completely closed at the inception of the uprising but that the subsequent 
opening  of  these  structures  led  to  a  plethora  of  (re)mobilizing  movements  –  actually 
showing that changes in political context influenced mobilization dynamics after the actual 
revolution of January 14th 2011.
Keywords : Tunisia, Arab Spring, Democratization, Contentious Mobilization
Introduction 
The  story  has  become  infamous.  Mohammad  Bouazizi,  a  jobless  college 
graduate turned fruit seller, had his goods confiscated for illegal street selling. 
On top of this, he was slapped in the face by a police woman while it happened. 
In protest, on 17 December 2010, he set himself alight in front of the local city 
council in Sidi Bouzzid. He died weeks later (on January 5th 2011),i but popular 
protests that had started after his self-immolation had already spiraled out of 
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control. Via neighboring cities, and soon to the capital Tunis, they tumbled into 
an open revolt against the rule of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. As a consequence the 
president fled for Saudi Arabia – never to return. Mohammad Bouazizi's self 
immolation   would  be  the  start  of  the  Tunisian  uprising,  its  transition  to 
democracy – and the beginning of a wave of uprising that would sweep through 
the Arab world in 2011 and 2012. 
The above account is as simplified as it is misleading (and sometimes 
plain  wrong:  Bouazizi  was  no college  graduate  and the  police  woman later 
denied ever hitting him): social mobilization had been brewing for years, the 
protests  in  Sidi  Bouzzid  were  exceptional  but  not  unheard  of,  and the  self-
immolation of Mohammad Bouazizi was not in itself the final nail in the coffin 
of  Ben Ali.  Collective mobilizations  during the 2010-2011 uprising built  on 
previous events: from numerous strikes and protests in the Tunisian periphery 
since  2005,  including a  six  month-long uprising  in  Gafsa  in  2008,  to  more 
recent protests in the mining regions at the beginning of 2010. Without these 
earlier uprisings the Tunisian revolution would not have emerged. Even the date 
of  the  revolution,  14  January  2011,  although  now  fixed  in  the  collective 
memory, can be questioned: this was nothing more than the date that Ben Ali 
was lured (for that was what happened) out of Tunisia; it can be argued that the 
actual  revolution  was  only  achieved  more  than  two  months  later,  on  23 
February. 
Throughout these phases – before, during and after the breakdown of the 
Tunisian  authoritarian  regime –  collective  mobilization  changed as  result  of 
experience  and  changing  (political)  contexts.  The  peaceful  character  of  the 
protests, the use of modern media tools, the language of human rights, the role 
of students, labor organizations, and (eventually) the Islamists – all this was a 
result of, and changed with, the cascading changes in political structures that 
occurred as the revolution unfolded and transition set in. 
The following report aims to shed light on these dynamics by providing a 
detailed overview of the historical and structural background of the uprising and 
eventual  revolution.  It  discusses  resulting  (political)  opportunities  for  social 
mobilization; provides an overview of key actors and – eventually – gives a 
detailed overview of actual protest events taking place throughout this period. 
The paper has a strong empirical focus, and I have tried to keep analyses in the 
background. But, without wishing to force analysis on the reader, over the next 
pages I would urge the reader to keep the following issues in mind: existing 
student,  labor  and  “democratization”  movements  in  Tunisia  never  initiated 
protests, but they did provide the necessary structures for its emergence; they 
transformed short  episodes  of  discontent  over  material  grievances into more 
sustainable  mobilization  episodes  evolving  around  broader  socio-political 
grievances. The movements themselves were therefore not at the inception of 
the uprising, but they were crucial in shaping it. 
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Second, in the Tunisian case broad-based mobilization was behind the of 
forcing a  “full”  transition into democracy.  This  mobilization emerged in the 
context of a stable and closed political sphere. At the same time, throughout the 
various transition phases, social mobilization transformed due to the changing 
political  context.  As such,  the issue is to see to what extent,  and when, the 
political context was the “dependent” or “independent” variable, and how this 
changed over the course of the transition. It is impossible to argue that changes 
in the political context started the uprising: the political context was too stable. 
Yet it is also impossible to state that the political context was not an influence in 
the  period  during  and  after  the  23  October  elections,  when  increased 
polarization between secular and Islamist groups split mobilization as a direct 
consequence of political liberalization. 
Periodization
We  can  subdivide  the  Tunisian  transition  into  three  phases:  breakdown, 
transition and consolidation. I would add to these three phases a fourth “pre-
breakdown” period, as mobilization during the 2010-2011 uprising was very 
much contingent on previous mobilization in the country. As such, I would say 
we have to look at the following stages: 
• Phase 0: pre-breakdown. In broad terms from 2005 until 2010. An early 
example of protests in this period is the strike against a visit of Israeli 
prime minister Sharon to Tunis in November 2005. The first main protest 
event in this period, I would argue, was in 2008 in the mining region of 
Gafsa.  During  these  protests  economic  grievances  were  effectively 
translated  into  broader  demands  for  political  reform.  This  happened 
mainly through the interventions of local unionists and (human rights) 
activists. During this period the regime successfully repressed contention 
and the  overall  political  regime did  not  seem to  be  threatened  and/or 
unstable. 
• Phase 1: Breakdown. 17 December 2010 – 14 January 2011. The former 
is the date of Bouazizi's self-immolation, the latter is the date of president 
Ben Ali's departure. During this period demands focused on human rights 
and political reforms and later (on 8 January 2011) changed into demands 
for  the  fall  of  the  regime.  The  regime  initially  reacted  with  severe 
repression.  But  as  the  police  were  increasingly  overwhelmed  by 
protesters and the army refused to aid in repressing peaceful protests, the 
only  viable  option  to  end protests  was  seen to  be  the  removal  of  the 
President and his close associates.
• Phase 2: Transition. 14 January – 23 October 2011. This period runs from 
the exit of Ben Ali to the first election for the Constitutive Assembly. It 
was a period marked by continued mobilization against and pressure on 
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the political regime in order to force  democratic rule, and subsequently 
also by intensified social tensions between secular and resurgent religious 
movements. The repression of protests declined rapidly after the exit of 
Ben  Ali  but  did  not  disappear  completely  for  a  considerable  period. 
Additionally, the first weeks after Ben Alis exit were marked by clashes 
between Ben Ali's political police and regular police and armed forces.
• Phase 3: Consolidation. 24 October 2011 - ? This period starts with the 
election  of  the  Constitutive  Assembly.  The  task  of  the  Constitutive 
Assembly is to govern the country and draft a new constitution outlining 
the political future of the country. Though much is still  unclear – this 
report was written in February 2012 – it is clear that a truly democratic 
regime has not yet been instituted, nor will be for at least the next few 
years. I have nevertheless decided to call this the “consolidation” phase in 
order to clearly distinguish it from the pre-23 October 2011 period. It can 
be  argued  that  the  consolidation  phase  will  only  start  with  the 
implementation  of  a  new  constitution  and  elections  for  the  first 
democratically  chosen  parliament.  The  first  election  for  a  “real” 
parliament and government will probably not take place before 2014.ii
Protests 
In this section I follow the periodization as outlined above. For each period I 
outline  the  main  protests,  including  an  exploration  of  interaction  between 
relevant actors and the political regime; the influence of previous protests is also 
discussed.  Appendix C presents  an overview of  all  the  main  protest  events, 
including information on aims, organizers, numbers of protests, duration, and 
repertoires used. The appendix also provides a more elaborate reference list to 
(mostly Arabic, but also English and French) newspaper articles covering these 
protests. Appendix A provides a map of Tunisia as the following account often 
refers to specific cities. As the Gafsa protests of 2008 are often the first protests 
that activists allude to, the narrative starts there.
The Gafsa protest, January-June 2008. The inland Gafsa region is famous 
for  its  phosphate  mines  and  relative  poverty  compared  to  the  more  urban, 
coastal areas of the country. The 2008 protests were a reaction to what were 
perceived as  unfair  hiring  practices  by  the  Compagnie  Phosphate  de  Gafsa  
(CPG)  which  had  allegedly  set  up  a  hiring  deal  with  local  UGTT 
representatives.  Families  that  felt  disadvantaged  took  to  streets  and  were 
quickly supported by local union bodies, the communist PCOT party and its 
student wing (Chomiak 2011). The protests developed into weekly marches in 
which thousands participated and – eventually – clashed with police forces. The 
marches endured and spread throughout the mining region, and the aims of the 
protest broadened to include social injustice, repression and relative neglect of 
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the  regions  by  the  Ben  Ali  Regime  (Chomiak  2011,  5).  With  a  mixture  of 
repression, concessions and media blockage, the regime successfully contained 
the protests within the region and eventually, after some six months, repressed 
them. The Gafsa protests are important, first, because they proved to be one of 
the first times economic grievances were translated into broader socio-political 
claims; second, they proved that mobilization could be sustained over a long 
period;  and,  third,  it  was  one  of  the  first  times  that  Internet  was  used  to 
disseminate  news  blocked  from  formal  news  channels,  even  though  the 
influence of the internet was still limited at the time. iii It also taught people in 
the region that they could successfully press the government to give in to some 
of their demands.iv 
Though Gafsa was the site of the main uprising in the periphery, and took 
longest to quell, it was not the only one. In the years preceding the revolution 
there were  other  instances  where workers  started wildcat  strikes and where, 
increasingly, local activists became effective in sustaining mobilization. There 
were also protests in the mining region in January 2010 for instance.v Protests 
existed during this period, they just did not spread beyond the regions in which 
they originated. 
White Shirt protests,  22 May 2010.  These challenged Tunisian Internet 
censorship and attempted to show the absurdity of repression by the Ben Ali 
regime. It  was organized by a few young bloggers.  On Facebook the actual 
event was entitled “Ce samedi, je m'habille en blanc et je vais prendre un café  
sur L'avenue” (“this  Saturday I  will  wear  white  and go for  a  coffee  on the 
Avenue Bourghiba”) (as quoted in Chomiak 2011, 6). This was exactly what 
participants did, around a hundred people showed up in white - and dozens were 
arrested. But as the event was taped by various people and subsequently put on 
the  Internet  (Chomiak 2011;  Chomiak and Entelis  2011)  the  organizers  still 
considered it  a success.vi The event had shown the absurdity of the Ben Ali 
regime, and had for the organizers been a lesson in the power of filming and 
posting online in terms of creating outrage over authoritarian repression. 
Continuing  to  the  breakdown  phase. I  separate  this  phase  into  three  parts 
delineated by specific changes in the aims of collective mobilization. The first 
phase is marked by protests demanding political reform, between 17 December 
and 8 January. These protests were aimed at economic grievances and political 
reforms, and mainly took place in the periphery. The protests started with the 
self-immolation of Mohammad Bouazizi.vii The day after he set fire to himself 
in front of the regional office, the story spread quickly. Family members and 
sympathizers took to the streets on Friday 17 December 2010 to show their 
anger in front of the building of the regional government and RCD offices.viii An 
activist from Sidi Bouzzid recalls: 
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“So on Friday 17 December we gathered in front of the regional government 
building:  hundreds  of  unionist  and activists.  We had a  sit-in  in  front  of  the 
government building and stopped traffic, until 8 at night. […] together with the 
unemployed; and friends of Bouazzizi – all throwing oranges and other fruit at 
the regional government building.”ix
Crowds swelled from a few hundred to thousands within a few days. As noted 
above, there was a strong presence of local unions and opposition parties from 
the  beginning,  they  aided  in  the  organization  of  the  protests  and  demands 
quickly moved to include political reforms that would lead to development and 
work in the region. Within days the protests had spread to other towns in the 
Sidi Bouzzid region,x and to cities in neighboring regions such as Kairouan, 
Sfax and Ben Guerdane, asking for reforms and better job opportunities.xi They 
eventually spread to cities like Thrall, al Rageb and Menzel Bouzaiane (Beinin 
and Vairel 2011, 238).xii Clashes with the police erupted, with one youth killed 
in the first week, and another person committing suicide as a way to denounce 
the political situation.xiii  Local  coordination bodies were formed by activists 
from  opposition  parties,  student  movements  and  unions,  they  issued  press 
releases, coordinated action and fine tuned demands,xiv forming an infrastructure 
to manage and sustain the protests.
With unrest continuing in the periphery, a week later hundreds– mainly 
union  members,  opposition  figures  and  students  –  protested  in  front  of  the 
UGTT building in the capital. The protests intended to show solidarity to the 
people in Sidi Bouzzid and demanded a stop to heavy police repression of the 
protests and better work opportunities in the periphery.xv These protests did not 
at this time develop further into broad-based mobilization within the capital. 
Demands remained limited to political reforms and improvements in regional 
economic development. Tellingly, at the protests in front of the UGTT building 
signs  reading  “al-huriya,  karama,  wataniya”  (Freedom,  dignity  and 
nationalism), and “as-sharal Istihqaq” (Work is a Right) were put up.xvi None 
demanded  the  fall  of  the  regime.  The  overall  picture  was  of  mobilization 
occurring in the periphery and a regime that was – despite using harsh measures 
– incapable of effectively repressing it. Although some activists were protesting 
in solidarity in the capital,  the uprising was mostly taking place in the rural 
periphery. 
This all changed in the second period of  protests demanding the fall of  
Ben Al, between 8 January and 14 January – a period of less than a week. On 7 
January, heavy clashes broke out between police and protesters in the city of 
Thalla and around twenty people were killed in two days (although the numbers 
of protesters killed during the clashes continued to rise in following weeks and 
months,  rising  to  around  50)  (Allal  and  Geisser  2011).  As  result  of  the 
repression in Thalla, protesters began to demand not just reforms but the fall of 
the regime.xvii After the clashes, regime forces retreated from Thalla, causing 
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shock  waves  through  the  country  as  the  city  was  deemed  “liberated”  and 
providing encouragement for protests throughout the country.
Additionally, in a main critical turn around, the UGTT publicly voiced 
their support for the protests and called for a nationwide strike a week later on 
14 January 2011. The strike was to be preceded by a general strike in Souse on 
Wednesday (12 January) and Sfax on Thursday (13 January).xviii Throughout the 
preceding week pressure on the capital mounted. For the first time, during the 
night of 10-11 January 2011, popular street protests and clashes spread from the 
periphery to the center: hundreds of youths clashed with police forces in Rue de 
France  and  other  streets  close  to  the  central  Avenue  Bourghiba.  Clashes 
continued  and  increased  in  severity  up  to  the  14th.  The  day  itself  started 
peacefully with the general strike paralyzing the country and tens of thousands 
gathering on Avenue Bourghiba. The protesters were, literally, on the doorstep 
of the Interior Ministry and pressing their way through police cordons towards 
the entrance:xix 
 
“there were huge crowds gathered here, at the Avenue Bourghiba, in front of the 
Ministry of the Interior. And there were lines of police between the ministry and 
the protesters. People were pushing with increasing strength. […] Apparently 
the story had gone around that  there was a  stand off  at  the Ministry of the 
Interior. Some youths came on mopeds, drove through the crowds – and straight 
into the police. This is when the clashes started. I was standing here [a hundred 
meters  from the ministry]  and saw it  happening:  they were just  aiming and 
shooting straight into the protesters. This is when you realize you can die at any 
moment. The strange this is, on a day like that, you just don't care.”xx
That evening, earlier than anybody had expected,xxi a formal announcement on 
television had declared that the president had left the country and would not be 
allowed to return.xxii In the direct aftermath chaos ruled in the suburbs and city 
center. Street battles erupted and regular police, army and security forces loyal 
to Ben Ali fought each other. Dozens of civilians were shot randomly by snipers 
loyal to the security forces of Ben Ali. It took until the beginning of February 
for the situation to stabilize and basic security to returnxxiii with almost 3000 
members  of  the  political  police  arrested  by  the  army.  Despite  these  arrests, 
violent clashes continued in the periphery (particularly al-Kef, Gafsa and Qabla) 
between  police  and  youths  aiming  to  destroy  and  arson  police  stations 
throughout February.xxiv 
Within this context of extreme insecurity people continued to go to the 
streets and protest, demanding the RCD’s removal from political life. From 20 
January onwards increasing amounts of people, up to tens of thousands, would 
gather at the Ministry of the Interior and the headquarters of the RCD in the 
capital to demand the removal of RCD ministers from the government and an 
end to the former ruling party. In other cities too people took to the streets in 
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protest marches: in Sfax fifty thousand took to the street on the 26th to demand 
the  end  of  the  interim government.xxv When  on 28  January  2011  Mohamad 
Ghannouchi declared a complete reshuffle of the cabinet – removing all RCD 
ministers  except  himself  –  the  UGTT  declared  its  support  for  the  new 
government.xxvi Although many thought Ghannouchi should have stepped down 
as well, protests dwindled soon after. 
With the removal of Ben Ali, we move to the transition phase.xxvii After the exit 
of Ben Ali a wave of mobilization rolled across the country. This wave was 
highly  fragmented:  all  kinds  of  specific  groups  mobilized  around (material) 
grievances:  the  police  wanted  increases  in  their  pay,  journalists  demanded 
improved media, people protested around the country in front of regional state 
offices to claim their right to work, (wildcat) strikes  demanded higher wages 
for  factory  workers,  etc.  These  protests  would  continue  well  into  the 
consolidation phase after the elections of 23 October 2011 and continued at the 
time of writing (February 2012).xxviii The UGTT itself was in disarray for much 
of this period, rendering any kind of effective management of its local branch 
organizations limited. 
Within the this overall context two main protests stand out, Kasbah II  
(mid February 2011) and III (mid-July 2011), in addition to two smaller protest 
events at the beginning of May and the middle of August. Kasbah II emerged 
within a month of Ben Ali’s leaving the country. With him, family members and 
those in the inner circles of power left as well – but the party remained, and 
many ministers retained their positions in “the government of national unity”. 
Even  after  these  ministers  had  been  ousted,  the  government  was  led  by 
Mohamad Ghanoushi – himself an RCD member. In addition, no date had been 
set for elections, nor was there clarity over the police killings of citizens during 
the uprisings, and social forces remained excluded from the reform process. The 
people were increasingly critical of the way the revolution was proceeding and 
demanded the removal of Mohamad Ghanoushi and a clear election date. 
Most political opposition parties and their leaders (including the at that 
time still rebuilding Ennahda) joined the protests,  as did many human rights 
activists and well known people from “civil society”. From Sunday 20 February 
a  sit-in  began  at  Kasbah  square  with  groups  of  protesters  arriving  from 
throughout the country and joining the encampment. After Friday prayers on 25 
February  2011,  around  half  a  million  people  gathered  at  the  “Kasbah” 
government square to demand the exit of the government. The following day 
clashes broke out on the Avenue Bourghiba when protesters attempted to storm 
the Ministry of the Interior. Violent clashes continued through the afternoon and 
night  and  left  five  people  dead.  Mohammad  Ghanoushi  then  declared  on 
television  that  he  would  not  have  blood  on  his  hands  –  and  left.  He  was 
succeeded by 85 year old (pre-RCD candidates were the only ones suitable and 
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therefore elderly) Caid el Sebsi, a new government was formed and an election 
date set.xxix Soon after, the encampment emptied and the protests ended. 
The second main event  was the  Kasbah III  protest.  Though attempted 
multiple times after the February Kasbah II events, it was clear that in mid-July 
an alliance of (youth) NGOs and human rights activists would be able to gather 
a substantial amount of protesters for a new sit-in at the Kasbah square in order 
to demand greater for young people in the transition process, accountability for 
police actions during the uprising and the postponement of the election date to 
provide parties  more  time to organize.  As the  protesters  demanded an early 
election date, Ennahda did not support them, although it quickly accepted the 
date after  the demand was met by the interim prime-minister  Caid el Sebsi. 
Turnout at the protests was limited and dwindled in the weeks after it started. 
This was the last  time that  a  large common platform was formed to protest 
against the government – although at this time the protesters had already started 
to split along party lines. 
The two examples above are the main protest events. But ever since the 
exit of Ben Ali  protests have continued, demanding farther reaching reforms. 
Sometimes  these  have  developed  into  large  protests  events  and/or  violent 
clashes with the police. A main example of this type of mobilization is formed 
by the protests which followed a declaration by the former Minister of Interior 
Affairs (mid-May 2011) in which he claimed the military was planning a coup 
d'etat should the Islamists win the elections. Another example are the protests 
that emerged in mid-August,  when youths took to the streets demanding the 
political police be dissolved and clashed with police forces.xxx These two events 
are examples of protests that were not organized by political parties or unions, 
rather,  they  were  organized  by  youths  in  (formal)  NGOs  or  through  loose 
networks – supported by new media. The size of these events was limited, often 
drawing a few hundred protesters only, but they formed the core of the young 
mobilized Tunisians that kept up pressure on the government to fully reform and 
organize free and fair elections. 
 Another  set  of  protests  that  emerged,  and  that  gained  increasing 
importance as the revolution became memory and the new post-revolutionary 
political regime emerged, was the  protests around the cleavage of “seculars”  
versus “Islamists”. The main protest in this respect was that against the Nesma 
television channel after it showed a film about the Iranian revolution (entitled 
“Persepolis”) in which god is depicted. The film was shown only two weeks 
before the 23 October elections. In response to the airing of the film, thousands 
marched on avenue Bourghiba to show their anger at this “insult going to the 
base of Tunisian religious identity.” More radical Salafi Muslims tried to set fire 
to the house of the editor in chief of the television channel. Ennahda was not 
involved in the protests, and did not – as a party – openly support it.xxxi Ennahda 
members, individually, did. This protest was immediately followed by a protest 
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by secular  minded  Tunisians:  they  protested  against  an  Islamist  takeover  of 
politics and society and in particular in defense of women’s rights. Organized by 
leftist political parties and NGOs, they drew considerable crowds, though less 
than the protests they were a reaction to.  These are typical  examples of the 
“Islamist”-”secular” cleavage that gradually became more pervasive in popular 
protest. Both sides state that the other is authoritarian: seculars by arguing that 
“Islamists” want to impose Islamic rules on minorities,  therefore implying a 
dictatorship  by  the  majority;  and  Islamists  in  their  turn  claiming  that  the 
seculars  want  to  enforce  a  secularism that  is  not  a  natural  characteristic  of 
Tunisian society –thereby implying the reincarnation of the social engineering 
that was so specific to the authoritarian rule of Habib Bourghiba. 
The  “consolidation”  phase,  it  should  be  mentioned,  only  started  after  the 
electoral  victory  of  Ennahda  at  the  23  October  2011  elections  and  the 
installation  of  the  Constitutive  Assembly  and  its  government  at  the  end  of 
December. Therefore, mobilizations and (the importance of) protest events are 
still unclear. But a few dynamics have come to the fore. First, there have been 
no more protests in the name of “Tunisians” as such; rather the Islamist-Secular 
divide has become pervasive.  Though “moderate” Islamists do not take to the 
streets, continuing protests are carried out by two groups: Salafists – who argue 
that the government/Ennahda is not doing enough for Islam – and seculars – 
who argue they are doing too much. For instance, from November 28 th until the 
beginning of  January Salafists  blocked the  entrance to  one of  Tunis'  largest 
universities  (Manouba),  demanding  the  right  to  wear  the  Niqab  within  the 
university. Salafi youngsters have started a hunger strike, and – although the 
entrance has been cleared – they continue their sit-in. A second example on the 
28th of January saw a large protest in the center of town that aimed to show the 
power of secular forces in Tunisia. It was the culmination of various secularly-
minded protests (another example is the #occupyBardo protests during the first 
three weeks of January 2012) that had taken place since the electoral victory of 
Ennahda. 
Another issue is the  continuing strikes, all over the country, demanding 
work.  These  strikes  are  paralyzing  the  domestic  economy  and  seem  to  be 
frustrating the work of the new government. The new prime-minister went so 
far  as  to  ask  for  a  six  month  “time  out”  from the  protesters  –  just  so  his 
government could get  the country back on track.xxxii How these protests will 
develop  is  still  uncertain,  but  it  is  clear  that  it  will  only  be  when  the  new 
constitution  is  written  and  implemented  and  trust  in  the  democratic 
characteristics  of  the  new government  is  entrenched  within  society  that  the 
Tunisian democratization process will end, and – maybe – mobilization in the 
country will return to “normal” levels. 
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Structural Conditions
To understand the dynamics of the 2010-2011 uprising we need to consider the 
historical development of Tunisia since its independence from France in 1956, 
and how it  has developed under its  two presidents,  Habib Bourghiba (1956-
1987) and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011), since then. 
The basis of the structural conditions underpinning transition today were 
laid, as is true in many Arab countries, during the struggle for independence 
against the French between the early 1930s and the 1950s (Perkins 2004). The 
independence  struggle  itself  was  a  relatively  peaceful,  non-militarized 
undertaking. This can be explained by the fact that the resources necessary to 
sustain a long drawn out conflict were not presentxxxiii and French incentives to 
hold on to Tunisia were limited. In comparison to its direct neighbors (Algeria 
to the west and Libya to the east), for instance, Tunisia is a relatively small 
country  with about  ten  million  inhabitants  and,  apart  from a  few phosphate 
mines, few natural resources.xxxiv In addition, Tunisia has never been as closely 
integrated in French political structures as its Algerian neighbor. An important 
practical result of the above for the dynamics of the uprising in 2010-11 was the 
fact  that  the  armed  forces  have  never  played an  important  role  in  Tunisian 
politics or economics, and have remained relatively small compared to other 
Arab armies.
It  was  during  the  struggle  for  independence  that  most  of  the  central 
Tunisian  political  actors  emerged.  First  was  the  dominant  party  in  Tunisian 
politics  before the uprising,  the  Rassemblement  Constitutionel  Démocratique 
(Constitutional Democratic Rally, or RCD), which was a direct descendant of 
the neo-Destour movement that led the uprising against the French. In addition, 
in  1946,  the  domestic  worker’s  movement  (Union  Générale  Tunisienne  du 
Travail) was founded.xxxv The UGTT would become, next to the Neo-Destour, 
the backbone of the independence struggle (Alexander 2010, 1041–58). In the 
final  years  of  the  struggle  the  two  were  closely  allied  against  the  French 
(Perkins 2004, 124). In return for its support the union demanded a key role in 
post-independence Tunisian political life. In the final years of the independence 
struggle an internal conflict emerged between more secular progressive parts of 
the  Neo-Destour  (led  by  Habib  Bourghiba)  and  more  conservative  (and 
religiously  minded)  militant  groups  (led  by  Saleh  Bin  Youssef).  Bourghiba 
would prove victorious – in large part because of his allegiance to the (leftist-
secularist parts of the) UGTT (Perkins 2004, 124). 
This  leads  us  to  another  issue:  Bourghiba's  staunch  secularist  stance. 
Bourghiba was the type of president that believed he knew the needs of his 
population, even though the people themselves might not realize those needs 
just yet. This concerned the position of religion in society particularly. Probably 
radicalized  through  his  fight  with  Ben  Yussif  in  the  final  years  of  the 
independence struggle, as soon as he had gained solid power over the state and 
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party, Bourghiba set out to “educate” “his” people. 
In the first  few years after independence an elaborate (and successful) 
policy to reduce the authority of religious elites was implemented, in addition to 
the drafting and application of one of the most progressive family laws in the 
Arab  world  (Halliday  1990;  Esposito  and  Voll  2001).  At  the  same  time, 
Bourghiba successfully silenced the opposition with a mixture of repression and 
broad-based clientelism, institutionalized through his neo-Destour party. As a 
consequence,  Tunisia  developed  as  a  secular  country  into  the  late  1970s 
(although  society  was  generally  actually  more  conservatively-minded),  and 
clientelistic  networks  permeated  various  socio-political  groups  and layers  of 
society.
Bourghiba's  later  tenure  was  marked  by  two struggles  that  developed 
these structural factors further. There was a continuing struggle with labor and 
student movements, mainly embodied by the UGTT. As politics stabilized and 
Bourghiba pulled more political power towards himself, the UGTT demanded 
more  of  a  say  in  economic  policy  setting.  Bourghiba  reacted  by  out-
maneuvering and subsequently co-opting the union – rendering it a mouthpiece 
of  his  regime.  Rather  than  having  socialist  policies  defining  the  country’s 
economics, Bourghiba used the UGTT as his main organization to silence leftist 
mobilization  against  his  increasingly  authoritarian  rule  (Perkins  2004). 
Although these strategies were generally successful,  the UGTT remained the 
primary  structure  for  organizing  discontent  and  would,  in  a  few  instances, 
awaken from its co-optation induced lethargic state following popular pressure 
from the rank and file.  One of  these instances was in the late 1970s,  when 
deteriorating economic conditions led to a nationwide strike and protests on 26 
January 1978.  Hundreds of  protesters  were killed by the police.  As a  direct 
response,  however,  some  political  liberalization  was  initiated,  including  the 
legalization  of  a  number  of  leftist  opposition  parties.  But  liberalization  was 
quickly reversed as it emerged that the ruling party might lose in subsequent 
elections.  These  brief  political  liberalizations  were  of  importance  in  another 
unexpected  way:  they  uncovered a  new,  previously  underestimated,  Islamist 
political movement in the country (Perkins 2004). 
The second struggle was against the Tunisian Islamists, and specifically 
against the Movement of Islamic Tendency founded by Rashd Ghanoushi (b. 
1941) and Abdalfatah Mourou (b. 1948). Inspired by both the Islamic revolution 
in Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Esposito and Voll 2001), they 
opposed increasing secularization under Bourghiba. The movement started as a 
small Islamic learning group that developed into a popular Islamist  dawa'xxxvi 
movement and subsequently into a political Islamist one. Not without reason, 
Bourghiba began to view the Islamists as his prime opponents (Esposito and 
Voll  2001)  and  his  stance  towards  them became  progressively  more  hostile 
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(Waltz 1986). His rule ended as a direct consequence of his attempt to have 
Islamist  leaders,  including  Rashd  Ghanoushi,  tried  and  executed  in  1987. 
Playing on his deteriorating mental state, he was declared unfit to exercise his 
duties by interior minister and head of the political police Zine El Abidine Ben 
Ali, who subsequently took over his position (Noyon 2003). 
Ben Ali's rule differed in a few important ways from Bourghiba's (Alexander 
2010, 1530–49). Whereas Bourghiba always stressed the importance of national 
unity  in  “democratic”  Tunisia,  and  used  this  “unity”  to  legitimize  his 
authoritarian rule,  Ben Ali  stressed the virtues of  liberal  democracy,  only to 
change the rules of the game whenever the rule of the (newly named) RCD was 
threatened.  For  the  Islamist  movement  Ben  Ali  brought,  initially,  hope  for 
democratization and an opening up of the political sphere (Alexander 1997). 
Political liberalization was initiated and many opposition parties became more 
publicly  active  –  including  the  Movement  of  Islamic  Tendency.  The  party 
adopted  its  current  “non-Islamic”  name  Harakat  Ennahda  (the  Renaissance 
Movement)xxxvii in February 1987 to appease the government and attempt to gain 
formal recognition. Ben Ali failed to formally recognize the party however, and 
Ennahda  politicians  participated  in  elections  as  independents  (Allani  2009, 
263). After Ennahda candidates saw a strong showing in the elections of 1989, 
Ben Ali backtracked on political liberalization and, between 19'89 and 1992, 
had  thousands  of  Islamists  arrested.  The  principle  leader  of  the  Ennahda 
movement,  Rashd Ghanoushi,  was forced to live in exile (Esposito and Voll 
2001).xxxviii Despite this repression the informal network at the base of the dawa'  
movement remained, proving impossible to root out completely. 
As the years progressed, Ben Ali’s rule gradually became more blatantly 
authoritarian.  The secular  opposition was forced either into irrelevance or to 
play by Ben Ali’s rules, hoping for some influence through the pluralism his 
democratic discourse provided (Alexander 2010). As the Ministry of the Interior 
and  its  political  police  became  more  powerful,  these  options  became 
increasingly narrow. The unions were either co-opted or  disbanded, the elite 
opposition harassed or forced into exile. Additionally, the traditional endemic 
clientelism  of  the  RCD  continued  alongside  economic  liberalization  in  the 
1990s and 2000s and the increasing concentration of political  and economic 
power in family members of the president (the Economist 2011). This rendered 
Ben Ali's rule much more “family-based” than Bourghiba's had ever been. The 
practical  result  was  that  the  ruling  family,  the  RCD  party  structure,  state 
organizations (specifically the Ministry of the Interior) and economic structures 
became increasingly interconnected. It seemed that in a context of a worsening 
political  climate these political-economic networks provided the regime with 
the political alliances necessary to stabilize its rule (Hibou 2004; Hibou 2006; 
Heydemann 2004). Where public discontent emerged at the periphery, a mixture 
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of repression and co-optation was applied – local activists were bought off and 
protests  forcefully  dispersed,  all  combined  with  media  blackouts  to  prevent 
unrest from spreading to other areas. 
Arguably  crucially,  the  last  few  years  before  the  uprising  saw  the 
adoption of Internet, blogs and social media by (young) parts of society. As in 
any  other  country,  the  introduction  of  these  new  channels  for  sharing 
information altered the media landscape considerably. It became much easier for 
regular  citizens  to  spread  images  and  news  to  others  and  pass  them  to 
mainstream media. This posed some challenges in imposing media blackouts – 
an  important  tool  in  containing  protest.  Although  there  are  technologies 
available for the effective control and supervision of blogs and sites such as 
Facebook, the Tunisian regime seemed not to have adopted them. As a result, it 
resorted  to  draconian  measures  in  its  reaction  to  these  new challenges.  For 
instance, in 2010 it shut down Facebook altogether – which led to international 
outcry and a quick reversal. Summarizing all of the above, the structural context 
on the eve of the uprising was marked by: 
• a concentration of political and economic power in the family of Ben Ali 
in a context of a close integration of the ruling RCD party with state and 
economic elites. Concerning formal state institutions, the Ministry of the 
Interior  (and  its  political  police)  lay  at  the  center  of  institutionalized 
power. The army was historically small and kept so due to fears of a coup 
d'état. 
• The Tunisian  economy was well  developed in comparison to  its  Arab 
neighbors,  though  corruption  and  clientelism meant  the  economy  and 
politics  became  increasingly  intertwined  and  centrally  focused. 
Development at the periphery was also lacking in the main cities near the 
coast.  Income  disparities  were  rising  fast.  In  addition,  strong  labor 
organizations (and many of their branches) were present, though co-opted 
by the regime. 
• Social  policies  had  resulted  in  an  outwardly  strong  secularly-minded 
society, with one of the lowest birth rates of the region, the highest levels 
of education, and progressive family law. Domestically, a conservative 
element in society was forcefully kept in check. Islamists were prevented 
from  formal  institutionalization  through  severe  repression,  but  it  was 
clear that a movement remained present. Since the early 2000s, Salafism 
had begun to emerge. 
• Developments  in  information  and  communication  technology  were 
changing the domestic media landscape, facilitating information sharing 
between individual citizens and (traditional) mass media outlets.
Following the departure of Ben Ali, two interim governments succeeded one 
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another before elections to the Constitutive Assembly. First, directly after Ben 
Ali's exit, his prime-minister Mohamed Ghannouchi (not to be confused with 
the unrelated Rashd Ghannouchi, the leader of the Islamist Ennahda party) took 
over  political  power  and  formed  a  government  of  national  unity  –  inviting 
numerous opposition figures to take part. Exiled opposition figures were told 
they could return to Tunisia; the repression of protests decreased considerably; 
the  UGTT became  much  more  independent,  and  political  liberalization  was 
(said to be) initiated. At the same time, a number of powerful RCD ministers 
remained in government (though they were removed in a government reshuffle 
at the end of January). The party itself was still functioning, no political police 
were brought to justice and – crucially – no date was set  for  elections.  Not 
surprisingly, many Tunisians were not at all  certain of the true nature of the 
reforms initiated. 
A second government was formed after continued protests on 25 February 
2011. It was led by 85-year old Beji Caid el Sebsi. No RCD members took part  
in this interim-government and the electoral law was amended so that members 
of the interim government were barred from participating in the elections for a 
majlas ta'sisi  (Constitutive Assembly) that would draft a new constitution, call 
fresh elections and govern the country in the meantime. An initial date was set 
for the elections: 24 July 2011.xxxix This was later postponed to give new parties 
more time to prepare and organize for the elections. In addition, the political 
police  was  disbanded,  the  power  of  the  interior  ministry  checked  through 
institutional reforms and, finally, the RCD party was banned by court order on 9 
March 2011. 
The elections of 23 October 2011 were overall  seen as a success. The 
government is now led by a troika of the Islamist Ennahda, the centrist CPR and 
the leftist Attakatol. The prime minister, Hamadi Jabali, is from Ennahda, the 
President,  Moncef  Marzouki,  is  from  the  CPR  and  the  president  of  the 
Constitutive Assembly is Mustapha Bin Jaafar, from Ettakatol.xl No formal time 
limit for the process of drafting the constitution and calling subsequent elections 
has been set.  Hamadi Jabali  stated on 3 February 2012 that the government 
aimed to hold fresh elections within 18 months.xli 
Contingent Political Opportunities
Considering  political  opportunities  in  the  traditional  sense  –  that  is  party 
alliances, divisions in political elites, the emergence of potential allies within 
the political sphere, and elections contested – there were no real shifts to speak 
of during Ben Ali's tenure and the political sphere remained closed off to (the 
influence of) movements within society. This was true both before and during 
the  uprising.  It  is  obvious  that  just  before  14  January  2011  Ben  Ali  was 
increasingly perceived as a liability by his close advisors and therefore advised 
to leave the country for a few days while the domestic situation calmed down. 
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After he left, the government issued a formal statement that he would not return. 
But this internal dissent only became known publicly months after his removal. 
In  addition,  there  were  no  (plans  for)  reform  projects,  nor  was  there  any 
substantial foreign pressure that created a critical space for dissent in the months 
leading  up to  December  2010.  As  such,  there  were  no  (perceived)  political 
opportunities for collective mobilization (of any type) in the traditional sense 
before 14 January 2011. 
Nevertheless,  we  may  say  -  in  a  less  traditional  sense  -  that  three 
dynamics were at the basis of perceived opportunities for popular protest in the 
years leading up to the uprising. The first was the learning process in which 
opposition figures began to cooperate with (wildcat) strikers and protesters at 
the  periphery,  and  the  realization  that  these  types  of  cooperation  could  be 
successful  in sustaining popular  mobilization.  Second, the logic followed by 
domestic political/state elites in engaging with protests was not to repress them 
at their start, but often to buy them off at their end. This type of “carrot” tactic 
taught activists they could go onto the streets, get away with it, and gain some 
government concessions. Third, because of a changing media landscape, news 
about protests spread faster and became increasingly uncensored. Also related to 
this,  activists  understood  that  when  protests  happened  in  one  town,  the 
protesters could be helped by taking to the streets in a neighboring town: this 
forced the police to spread out over a larger region. As such, it can be said that 
the combination of increased cooperation between unionists and (human rights) 
activists,  the perception of a regionally weakened repression and a changing 
media landscape proved the basis on which the uprising was built. 
As the protests started in Sidi Bouzzid, they quickly spread to cities in the 
surrounding  area.  With  the  (political)  police  as  the  only  effective  tool  for 
repressing  collective  contentious  mobilizations,  the  police  forces  were  soon 
overwhelmed by the extent and geographic spread of the protests: they could 
not be everywhere at once. With the army remaining on the sidelines, this gave 
protesters  the  possibility  to  continue  and  concurrently  strengthened  the 
perception that  they were powerful  enough to face the regime.  When police 
forces retreated from Thalla on 8 January 2011 following heavy clashes, this 
was perceived as a direct victory for the protesters over the police and Ben Ali's 
regime and sent shockwaves through the country. The 14th was set as a national 
strike.   As the 14th approached and the police forces  had to  focus all  their 
strength on the capital – thereby effectively retreating from most other towns in 
the countryside – it was a clear sign for many that the regime was on the verge 
of collapse, which fanned protests even more. Interestingly, on 11 January 2011 
the army moved into the capital at night in what later proved to be an attempt to 
secure state buildings. That night, many thought that that a coup d'etat had taken 
place and that the army had taken over.xlii Although these rumors proved to be 
false, it was the first time that non-mobilized citizens dared to contemplate an 
end to Ben Ali’s rule – making it a key event in the perception of opportunity 
Numero pagina
among ordinary Tunisians. 
As the day of the general strike drew closer the police forces were seen as 
obviously incapable of repressing mobilization and the army remained on the 
sidelines. More and more people thus saw an opportunity and seized it. The 
turnout on the 14th of January was overwhelming and marked the end of Ben 
Ali’s rule. 
With the exit of Ben Ali a period of political turmoil began. Throughout this 
period there  were  so  many  changes  within  the  political  sphere  that  specific 
configurations of political actors remained obscure. The general perception was 
that  many within the Ministry  of  the Interior  attempted to  salvage as much 
power as they could.  In the end they failed,  in large part  due to continuing 
mobilizations pressuring for reforms. It was unclear (and many were skeptical) 
to what extent the Ghannoushi government constituted a real break from Ben 
Ali  and  RCD  rule.  The  government  attempted  to  include  some  opposition 
figures in the government, but many quit after a number of weeks, disillusioned. 
Others never joined in the first place. The revolution therefore brought about a 
complete opening of opportunities on one side, in that repression decreased and 
the political sphere was completely open, and on the other in that the ensuing 
chaos meant that particular  configurations  within the political  sphere had no 
influence –they were simply invisible and unknown to the wider public to a 
great  extent.  What  changed  in  the  second  interim  government  (under  the 
leadership of Beji  Caid el  Sebsi)  was that  the RCD and the Ministry of the 
Interior (both considered by many as bastions of “anti-revolutionary forces”) 
were considerably weakened. In combination with the law that established that 
none of the ministers of the interim government would be allowed to run in the 
elections, this meant that overall skepticism over the reform process decreased 
and the particular configurations of actors did not influence mobilization. 
In the October 23 Constitutive Assembly elections, Ennahda won 89 out 
of  217  seats;  the  centrist  Congress  for  the  Republic  (Congrès  pour  la  
République or  CPR)  won 29,  the  leftist  Ettakatolxliii 20,  Chebi’s  Progressive 
Democratic  Party  (or  PDP)  16,  and  the  Popular  petition  party  -  a  populist 
Islamist party that was completely unknown before the elections - won 26 seats. 
The umbrella party for the traditional (strongly secular) opposition movements, 
the Democratic Modernist Pole (Pôle démocratique moderniste or PDM), won 
only 5 seats and the Tunisian Workers' Communist Party (Parti communiste des  
ouvriers de Tunisie, or PCOT) only 3. Both are historically important opposition 
parties in Tunisia.  The rest of the seats were shared among smaller parties.xliv 
What  the  installment  of  the  newly  elected  government  (and  with  it  the 
representation  of  multiple,  democratically  chosen  parties  in  the  Constitutive 
Assembly) will mean for mobilization on the ground remains to be seen. 
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Actors in transition: Elites.  
The most  relevant  actors  are  discussed in  chronological  order  following the 
various stages of the uprising and focusing on their (changing) positions and 
strategies vis-à-vis the latter. 
The political clique of Ben Ali. This is not, as such, the ruling RCD but 
rather the group around the president (and most crucially Ben Ali himself) that 
had meaningful influence over decision making processes before the revolution. 
Ben Ali’s position  changed throughout the uprising from outright defiance to a 
much more conciliatory stance, giving a voice to these political elites. In three 
televised speeches throughout the uprising this change was clearly observable. 
In his last address he stated (in Tunisian dialect) that he was the only one that 
“knew the needs of the Tunisian people” and thereby implied he was the only 
viable choice to lead the country. The speech was overall perceived as a show of 
weakness  and  helped  to  fan  protests.  As  the  uprising  developed,  increasing 
pressure  was  placed  on  the  position  of  the  president.  Though  no  schisms 
appeared  visible  within  relevant  elites,  a  common  understanding  that  the 
position of the president was at risk must have grown. He was asked to leave the 
country temporarily for his own safety, and thereafter not given the possibility 
to return. 
The Tunisian Army and General Rachid Ammar. As described before, the 
Tunisian  army  is  a  professional  body,  relatively  small,  and  holds  no  large 
economic interests in the country. When protests reached the capital and army 
units took up positions at government buildings, Ben Ali ordered the army to 
repress  the  protests,  an  order  which  General  Rachid  Ammar  subsequently 
refused.xlv What might have played a role here is the fact that relations between 
the army and the Ben Ali regime had been strained since top army generals had 
died  in  a  helicopter  crash  in  2002.  Regime  involvement  in  the  crash  was 
suspected. Rachid Ammar's refusal made Ben Ali’s presidency unsustainable. 
Typically, almost immediately after the formal declaration that Ben Ali would 
not return, the army confirmed its support for the new government and stated it 
would follow any order the new government gave.xlvi In the months after 14 
January 2011 the army was crucial in maintaining a reasonable level of safety in 
the country, as the police apparatus stopped functioning. The force has always 
maintained an apolitical stance and refrained from intervening in politics. 
The  Tunisian  General  Labor  Union  (in  French:  Union  Générale 
Tunisienne  du  Travail  or  UGTT).  Although  formally  a  representation  of 
workers’ movements in society, the UGTT had been so closely intertwined with 
the political regime that it is described here as an elite actor. It is the umbrella 
organization for all labor unions in the country, although local branches were 
not  as  well  integrated  within  the  UGTT as  was  generally  expected.  When 
protests occurred in the periphery it was local human rights organizations and 
trades unions that formed the basic institutional structure upon which protests 
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were sustained and spread – independently of the UGTT umbrella organization. 
This  entails  that  the co-optation of  unions  by the  political  regime was only 
achieved to a limited degree in the various regions (Allal and Geisser 2011). A 
senior  Tunisian  analyst,  Abdal  Jalil  Tamimi,  stated  in  an  interview with  the 
author that: 
“The problem was  […] that  the  union  could  not  move  freely.  Its  room for 
maneuver  was  limited  and  it  could  not  trespass  these  limits.  The  union's 
influence was limited, and therefore the power of the union against the regime 
weak. But this concerns the central union. When we consider the branches of 
the  union  things  are  different.  The  branches  in  the  region  had  some 
independence. Because unionists in the regions were close to the people, they 
knew what was truth and what were lies. It made them crucial in mobilization. 
For instance, the uprising in Sfax – at the start of the revolution – did not come 
from the UGTT. 50.000 people were there.  Who organized them? The local 
union in Sfax.”xlvii
In the first three weeks of the uprising, the UGTT kept a low profile and did not 
release any statements either on the protests or on the violence in Sidi Bouzzid 
and other regions. This changed around 8 January when violence and popular 
protests  escalated.  At  this  point  the  rank  and  file  within  the  organizations 
pressured the union to take a stance and called for a general strike on January 
14th 2011.  This  would  prove  to  be  the  day  that  the  regime around Ben  Ali 
collapsed. Following the collapse of the regime the union maintained a critical 
stance vis-à-vis the interim government of Mohammad Ghanoushi, and was one 
of the key organizers of the Kasbah II protests that led to the fall of Ghannoushi 
and the installment of the Sebsi government. The UGTT subsequently supported 
the  new  government  and  remained,  thereafter,  quiescent.  This  relative 
quiescence can be explained by internal turmoil that followed the uprising. In 
addition  many  activists  started  electoral  lists  for  the  Constitutive  Assembly 
elections, and therefore left the UGTT. The internal turmoil was only resolved 
with new internal elections at the beginning of 2012. 
Notably, many  types  of  elites  were  also  absent during  the  protests. 
Religious leaders, for example, were completely absent, as were mosques (and 
other  religious  institutions)  as  a  framework  for  structuring  and  managing 
mobilization  during  the  uprising.  This  was  in  part  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
Tunisian religious sphere is relatively weak. Another reason is that elites from 
Islamist movements were either still in prison or opted to remain silent – for 
fear of tainting the uprising with an “Islamist” brush and thereby fragmenting 
mobilization.  Concerning more general,  intellectual  elites,  many voiced their 
support for the uprising – either from abroad or domestically – but all refused to 
become “leaders” of the movement or influence public discourse in any crucial 
way. The uprising had an explicit and public “leaderless” character. 
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After  the  elections,  in  what  I  have  dubbed  the  “consolidation”  phase,  the 
strength of  political  parties  –  and with them social  movements  – in  society 
became clearer.  Islamism returned as the main force in elite  politics,  as  did 
multiple  secular  parties;  most  notably  the  CPR and  attakatol.  This  has  also 
meant  that  new  elites—among  them  new  Islamist  and  secular  elites--are 
emerging. Concerning the Islamists, this emergence holds both in the sense of 
key politicians,  like the prime-minister  Hamadi Jabali;  and religious leaders, 
like the scholars at the Zeytuna university, who are becoming part of a newly 
emerging  socio-political  elite  group.  Likewise,  some previously  well  known 
opposition figures are gaining a central position in either politics or the public 
sphere.  The  main  examples  here  are  Yadh  Ben  Achour,  head  of  the 
constitutional drafting committee, Hamma Hammami, head of the communist 
party, and Najib Chebbi, one of the leaders of the largest opposition parties, the 
PDP.  But  this  process  is  still  in  its  infancy,  and  therefore  the  influence  on 
mobilization is hard to predict. 
Actors in transition: Civil Society 
Before  and  during  the  breakdown  phase  three  movements  were  particularly 
important:  the  Tunisian  labor  movement,  the  student  movement  and  the 
democratization/human rights movement. Religious (e.g. Islamists) movements 
were present but not (able to) publicly mobilize and did not therefore play a 
significant role. 
Labor movement.  As described earlier,  the Tunisian  labor  movement’s 
history dates back to before independence. It is embodied in a union structure 
that  is  present  throughout  the  country  at  local,  regional  and national  levels. 
There are unions for all types of professions (the most active are the lawyers’ 
and teachers’ unions) and the main umbrella organization is the UGTT.xlviii The 
extent to which the UGTT controls its local branches outside the capital proved 
limited when popular protests emerged in the years leading up to the 2010-11 
uprising. Therefore, local union goups acted independently from their umbrella 
organization. The practical result of this was that the labor movement in the 
periphery  provided  activists  with  the  necessary  structures  to  sustain 
mobilization.  Before the 2010-2011 uprising (for  instance in Gafsa in 2008) 
these  local  unions  had  already  been  critical  in  terms  of  translating  direct 
material grievances (related to unemployment and regional underdevelopment) 
to  more  political  demands  for  reform  and  better  regional  (economic) 
development.  The influence  of  the  labor  movement  can  also  be  seen in  the 
central role of strikes in mobilization: not only in the final days of the uprising – 
after  the  UGTT had  voiced  its  support  –  but  also  in  its  first  weeks  when 
mobilization was still mainly focused in the periphery. 
Student movement. Like the labor movement, the student movement has a 
long history in Tunisia. Activism within universities has always been present in 
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the country: this is even true of secondary (and in extreme cases even primary) 
schools. Student bodies within the universities represent these movements. With 
student movements so powerful in the country it is not surprising that the end of 
the Christmas holidays marked an escalation in protests. Subsequently Ben Ali 
shut the schools down. As such, it was schools and universities – rather than 
mosques as seen in subsequent uprisings in the Arab world – that provided an 
important infrastructural basis for mobilization. The preferred modes of protest 
were marches and sit-ins (at universities and schools). The framings of protests 
seemed to follow those of the labor movement.
It is clear that the revolution in Tunisia was built on a youth revolt: it was 
mainly  young  people  that  took  to  the  streets  in  protest.  But  the  student 
movement was not, as such, at the basis of this mobilization. The initial uprising 
was built with the participation  of youths that had already graduated but not 
entered professional life – high youth unemployment being considerably high in 
Tunisia. Therefore these people did not belong to college or university life. This 
forms part of the explanation of why the uprising started in the countryside and 
not the cities. In the periphery, youth unemployment is high. At the same time 
there are  neither  universities  nor other  educational  centers--meaning that  the 
student  movement  is  weak.  What  did  happen,  however,  was  that  as  the 
mobilization developed the student movement played a crucial role in building 
mobilization in the larger cities: it was in the universities that many protests 
were initiated. 
Democratization/Human Rights Movements.  Human rights activists have 
long been present in the country, and many human rights organizations existed 
under the rule of Ben Ali. More specifically, Tunisia counts the Tunisian League 
of Human Rights (Ligue Tunisienne de Droits de l'Homme or LTDH), the first 
human rights organization in the Arab world (Perkins 2004, 165). Under the 
previous  regime  possibilities  for  action  by  these  organizations  was  either 
heavily restricted or they were effectively co-opted and served as legitimization 
for the Ben Ali regime. However, as was the case with union activists, human 
rights activists in the regions participated in and provided structure to popular 
mobilization almost immediately after its emergence. As such, though silenced 
under  Ben  Ali  and  incapable  of  initiating  protests,  they  did  provide  crucial 
structures when protests erupted. 
More  generally,  activists  from  these  three  movements  provided  the 
institutional  structure  for  the  uprising  to  sustain  itself  and  spread  to  other 
regions  during  the  breakdown phase.  Practically,  this  happened  through  the 
founding of local councils in which activists from various movements worked 
together  to  disseminate  information,  plan  strikes  and  organize  marches.  For 
instance, within a week of the start of the uprising in Sidi Bouzzid, “a citizens' 
council”  was  formed  in  which  both  unionists  and  human  rights  activists 
participated.xlix This type of rapid coordination would probably not have been 
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possible without the experience acquired during the uprisings of previous years: 
for instance in Gafsa in 2008. Local activists were experienced in building up 
cross-movement  relations  to  channel,  co-ordinate  and  sustain  popular 
discontent.  After 14 January 2011, these councils,  the results of this type of 
cross-movement coordination, were transformed into “councils for safeguarding 
the revolution”.
During the  transition phase,  the main change concerning civil  society actors 
was  the  (re)mobilization  of  various  Islamist  movements.  A  few  of  these 
movements  that  form  the  more  obvious  examples  are  representations  of 
movements present in the wider Arab world. For instance,  Hizb al-Tahrir (the 
Liberation  party,  or  HuT)  is  part  of  a  global  movement  aimed  at  the 
reinstatement of the Islamic caliphate.l Despite some early successes in staging 
protests, it seems that their following in Tunisia remains limited, and they failed 
to gain formal recognition as a political party.li
A second family  of  Islamist  movements  is  the  Salafists. Compared to 
other Arab countries, Salafism is a relatively new phenomenon in Tunisia: it 
emerged in the early 2000s in the context of the American invasion of Iraq. 
After 2006 they were subject to widespread arrests (Allani 2009) and the most 
active Salafists were imprisoned during the uprising, and only released in the 
months following the revolution.  Despite  their  relative weaknesslii they have 
been increasingly visible in public life and, more specifically, in protests. They 
generally  build  on  very  fluid  and  informal  networks,  after  the  revolution 
specific mosques were “taken over” by Salafist movements and now constitute 
an important node within the infrastructure of the movement. Within Tunisia 
they have mainly mobilized around issues concerning the freedom of religion 
(being allowed to wear a Hijab to university for instance) and in reaction to 
perceived attacks against the Islamic basis of Tunisian identity and public life 
(for instance when the television channel Nesma showed Persepolis, see above). 
General repertoires include marches, public prayers, sit-ins and – occasionally – 
arson attempts. 
The two movements described above have clear collective identities and 
can  be  considered  examples  of  Islamist  social  movements.  The  majority, 
however, are far less clearly defined. It is a form of mobilized public religion: 
collective social mobilization on the basis of a national religious identity. There 
are  large  groups within Tunisia  that  wish  to  change the  social  and political 
context and collectively mobilize against a “secular” enemy. At the same time, 
however, they do not identify with either HuT or the Salafists. Many were part 
of the Ennahda  dawa' movement in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s or are, 
through family relations, linked to it. Ennahda’s transformation into a political 
party has not removed its institutional structure, nor its collective identity, upon 
which its  dawa’ movement may continue more publicly. It thereby created a 
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relative void in  societal  Islamist  mobilization.  How this  relative “void” will 
develop  in  the  future  remains  unclear.  It  is  a  movement,  or  family  of 
movements, that is in the process of (re)defining itself.
As the transition phase becomes the “consolidation” phase following elections, 
a new (political) elite is in the process of emerging and influencing mobilization 
dynamics on the ground. With the Islamist Ennahda in power, general Islamist 
mobilization has been pushed into the background while secular and Salafist 
mobilization has risen.
What is clear is that the common enemy of the Ben Ali regime, which 
brought  together  the  student,  labor  and  democratization  movements,  has 
disappeared. The major cleavage now is between Islamists on the one side, and 
secular actors on the other. Though secular activists often presume that “they” 
owned the uprising – and therefore were the mainstay of the mobilization forces 
of  the  revolution  –  this  does  not  seem to  hold  true  as  they  failed  to  draw 
significant amounts of people to the streets in defense of secularism. A more 
accurate assessment is probably that popular discontent was structured by these 
movements, rather then represented by them. 
Conclusion 
The report  has  provided a  detailed  overview of  the  historical  and structural 
background of the Tunisian uprising of 2011 and subsequent political changes. 
In the preceding pages I have discussed the resulting (political) opportunities for 
social mobilization, provided an overview of key actors and given a detailed 
overview of the actual protest events that took place throughout the period. I 
hope it is clear that existing student, labor and “democratization” movements in 
Tunisia did not initiate protests, but did provide crucial existing structures for 
protests to endure and spread. The movements themselves were therefore not at 
the inception of the uprising, but were crucial in shaping it.  This dynamic was 
only possible because of experience gained during earlier periods of collective 
mobilization  in  which  these  movements  had  interacted  for  short  term 
mobilization  around  specific  material  grievances.  Second,  I  hope  that  the 
empirical  overview  has  made  it  clear  that  so-called  “political  opportunity 
structures”  were  completely  closed  at  the  time  of  the  uprising  (therefore, 
changes in the constellation of political actors seem to have had little influence 
on  the  timing  of  the  uprising),  but  that  the  subsequent  opening  of  these 
structures led to a plethora of (re)mobilizing movements (actually showing that 
changes in political context were important, in that they influenced mobilization 
dynamics after January 14th 2011).
What the future will hold for Tunisia remains, of course, unknown. Social 
cleavages between secular and Islamist groups in society seem to be gaining 
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salience and dominating mobilization in the country; the future position of the 
workers movement (and the UGTT) vis-à-vis the political sphere is still an open 
question; the drafting process of the new constitution has just started and its 
outcome is still largely unknown. It is these issues, and many others, that will 
define how mobilization in Tunisia will develop in the coming years. 
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Appendix B: Newspapers and news sites used.
International Newspapers
• New York times /International herald Tribune (English and French)
• France 24 (English and French) 
• Al Hayat (Arabic, international) 
• As-Sharq al-Awsat (Arabic, international) 
Tunisian Political (weekly) newspapers 
• al Mawqif. (Arabic, Tunisian, PDP)
• Al tariq al-jadid (http://attariq.org) (Arabic, Tunisian, al-tajdid) 
• Al-Fajr (Arabic, Tunisian, Ennahda) NB: restarted in March 2011. 
Extra sources
• Aljazeera (english and arabic) 
• Al-Arabia (english and arabic) 
• as-Sabah (Arabic, Tunisian, State (Saher Matri)) 
• As-Sarih (Arabic, Tunisian)
• Ach chourouq (Arabic, Tunisian, State)
• La Presse (French, Tunisian, State)
• Al-Mouatin 
Useful Electronic Sources 
• UGTT website: ugtt.org.tn (only Arabic at time of writing, French and 
English parts of the website “under construction”.) 
• www.turess.com (French and Arabic  Tunisian press,  mostly (formerly) 
state related.)
• http://nahdha.info/arabe/index.php   (Arabic) 
• www.tunisia-live.net  
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Appendix C: Table of protests Beginning 2008 – End 2011
The table below notes the main protest events that occurred in the period under review. It aims to provide a general  
overview of the key protests (in the general perceptions of Tunisians) and to be used as a possible starting point for a  
more representative (and thorough) event analysis of Tunisian protests during this period. 
Name 
Date /  
duration Cities Aim # protesters Forms/repertoires Actors organizing 
Gafsa mining 
protestsliv
Start period: 
Jan-Feb 
2008. End: 
June 2008.lv
Gafsa, Redeyef,lvi 
Gabes.
From unfair hiring to 
general economic 
grievances.lvii
Thousands, 
estimates up to 
twenty 
thousand.lviii Protest marches.lix
“street-based”, later: 
workers, local 
teachers’ union?, 
PCOT.lx 
Tunesie en 
Blanclxi 
22 May 
2010lxii Tunislxiii
Against Internet 
censorshiplxiv
A few hundred, 
max. one 
thousand.lxv
Limited street 
protest, wearing 
white and walking 
in the main 
boulevardlxvi young bloggerslxvii
2010-2011 
“Revolution”
18 December 
– 7 January 
2011lxviii
Sidi Bouzzidlxix Bin 
Gardane, Sfax, 
Kairouan, Kasserine, 
Bin Arouslxx → 
Thalla.lxxi
Also, to a limited 
extent, in the 
capital.lxxii
Unemployment,lxxiii 
later, and mostly 
claimed by unions, 
human rights and 
political reforms.lxxiv 
At the start 
hundreds,lxxv 
increasing to 
thousands,lxxvi up 
to hundreds of 
thousands.lxxvii 
Protests in the 
capital: around 
500. 
Protest marches 
and strikes.lxxviii 
Additionally: 
arson,lxxix 
suicideslxxx towards 
the 7th: a few sit-
ins.lxxxi
Emerged 
spontaneously, but 
within days: (local) 
unions,lxxxii HR 
activists and (high 
school) political 
parties,lxxxiii 
students.lxxxiv 
8 January – 
14 January 
2011lxxxv
Cities around the 
country, including the 
capital.lxxxvi
As previous protests, 
but in addition: 
regime change.lxxxvii
In the capital from 
hundredslxxxviii to 
tens of thousands 
on 14 January.lxxxix 
Protest marches,xc 
strikes.xci Also: 
throwing stones at 
police, looting, 
arson of RCD 
offices.xcii 
Various unions and 
the UGTT (national 
Union),xciii students 
(high schools and 
universities)xciv
15 - (+\-) 29 
January.xcv 
Protests 
continued, 
but from this 
day became 
less frequent 
and smaller. 
xcvi 
Focused in the 
capital,, specifically 
at the Ministry of the 
Interior and RCD 
Headquarters.xcvii Also 
in multiple other cities 
(Tataouine, alMehdia, 
Kasarine, Sfax, Sidi 
Bouzzid),xcviii 
Thousands from rural 
regions traveled to 
the capital in a 
“freedom caravan”.xcix 
Demanding the fall of 
the “Unity 
government”, a new 
constitution and 
complete cut with 
RCD past by 
removing RCD 
ministers from 
government.c
Tens of 
thousands, 50 
thousand in 
Sfax.ci 
Protest marches,cii 
strikes (schools on 
first day they 
reopened..).ciii 
(Doctors’, lawyers’, 
teachers’) unions, 
“civil society”, political 
opposition parties.civ 
After RCD ministers 
were removed from 
government, UGTT 
supported the 
government and 
protests dwindled.cv 
Kasbah II 
19 - 26 
February 
2011.cvi 
In Tunis, people from 
Medenine, Gafsa, al-
Kef, Kasserine, etc.cvii 
Elections, new 
constitution, fall of 
government.cviii
Starting at 
hundreds,cix to 
tens of 
thousands,cx later: 
500.000cxi, 
estimates up to a 
million.cxii 
Sit ins,cxiii protest 
marchescxiv later 
also riots and 
attempts at 
storming (interior) 
ministries.cxv 
PCOT active, as other 
human rights activists, 
not the UGTT.cxvi
Kasbah III 
15 July 
2011.cxvii
From around the 
country, going to the 
government (Kasbah) 
Square in the 
capital.cxviii
7 demands in total,cxix 
among which: 
resignation of 
minister of justice 
and minister of the 
interior, 
independence of 
judges, 23 October 
as date of 
elections .cxx
700, quickly 
dispersed by 
police.cxxi
Protest and sit-in in 
front of prime-
ministerial 
building.cxxii
Coalition of youth 
NGOs, human rights 
activists.cxxiii
Anti-Nesma, 
Islamists 
protests 
9 and 14 
October.cxxiv
Reaction – 
protest for 
free 
expression on 
16October.cxxv
Tunis (Kasbah)cxxvi 
and cities around the 
country.cxxvii
Closing the Nesma 
channel for showing 
Persepolis on 7 
October.cxxviii
First day (9 
October) 300,cxxix 
later 
thousands.cxxx
Marches,cxxxi 
arsoncxxxii 0
Salafi 
Manouba 
Islamist 
protests.
From 28 
November → 
ongoing?cxxxiii
Tunis, University of 
Manouba.cxxxiv Similar 
protests earlier in 
Souse.
The right to wear a 
Niqab at the 
university.cxxxv A few dozen.cxxxvi
Sit in, barring 
students from 
entering the 
university.cxxxvii
Via mosques, informal 
networks?cxxxviii
Secular mass 
protest 
28 
November.cxxxix
Tunis, avenue 
Bourghiba.cxl
Defending freedom 
and against violence 
and (religious) 
extremism.cxli 8-10 thousandcxlii Marches.cxliii Unions, leftists.cxliv
Some protests that did not make it into the overview: 
1. (15 February 2011) The first Islamist protests.cxlv
2. (20 February 2011) In defense of secularism.cxlvi
3. (1 April 2011) Sit-in to demand the release of the police woman who slapped bouazizi.cxlvii
4. (17 April 2011) RCD people protesting because they were politically excluded.cxlviii
5. (5-12 May 2011) Protests after the former minister of the Interior said there would be a military coup if the 
Islamists won the elections.cxlix
6. (9 May 2011) Protests by journalists against continuing state frustration of independent news gathering.cl 
7. (29 June 2011) Salafists demanding the release of prisoners.cli
8. (18 July) General strike after a 14 year old girl was killed in post-Kasbah III clashes.clii
9. (13 August 2011) pPro-women’s rights protests demanding equality in inheritance (anniversary of the personal 
status code).
10.(15 August 2011) Outbursts of violence “just to have them remember”.cliii
11.(7 September 2011) Police union on strike...cliv
12.(3 November 2011, 1 December 2011 → for weeks) #occupy Bardo. In defense of Secularism after Ennahda’s 
electoral victory.clv
i  France 24. “Protester Who Set Himself on Fire Has Died, Says NGO - TUNISIA - FRANCE 24”, January 5, 2011. 
http://www.france24.com/en/20110105-protestor-who-set-himself-fire-has-died-says-brother. 
ii See the statement by prime-minister Jabali in February 2012. 
iii As in the testimony of Slim Amamou at Tamimi Center, Tunis (Tunisia), 5 November 2011. 
iv Interview with 'Alim from Sidi Bouzzid, Tunis (Tunisia), 15 March 2011.
v During these years, very little was written in the international press about these events and (of course) nothing was 
written in domestic newspapers. This leaves opposition newspapers, of which very few have a good (online) 
archive. Interview with a trade unionist from Sidi Bouzzid, Tunis (Tunisia), 15 March 2011. 
vi As in the testimony of Slim Amamou at Tamimi Center, Tunis (Tunisia), 5 November 2011. 
vii Attariq Aljadid, 25-31 Dec 2010, p.4. 
viiiAttariq Aljadid, 1-7 jan. p4. 
ix Interview with a trade unionist from Sidi Bouzzid, Tunis (Tunisia), 15 March 2011. [17:00 → 18:25] 
x al-Hayat. “Dar Al Hayat - رارمتسا :سنوت ةهجاوملا يف يديس ديزوب دادتماو تارهاظتلا ىلإ قطانم ةديدج ”, December 27, 2010. 
http://www.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/217045. 
xi al-Jazeera. “Tunisia Struggles to End Protests - Africa - Al Jazeera English”, December 29, 2010. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/20101229122733122341.html. 
xii Al-tariq, 1-7 jan 2011, p4.; Also, according to the BBC the number of self-immolations had risen fivefold since the 
uprising to 107 cases over the last year. See: BBC. “BBC News - Tunisia One Year on: New Trend of Self-
immolations”, January 12, 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16526462. 
xiiiIn the first week alone there were multiple instances of individuals – and at one point a mother with two children – 
who attempted suicide by throwing themselves into electricity wires. The woman failed as the electricity was cut by 
the authorities: France 24. “ ةرهاظم يف ةمصاعلا رثإ طوقس ليتق يف تاكابتشا عم ةطرشلا برق يديس ديزوب -  
سنوت - FRANCE 24 - Monte Carlo Doualiya”, December 24, 2010. http://www.france24.com/ar/20101224-sidi-
bouzid-tunisia-suicide-menzel-bouzaiane-dead-clashes-police. 
xiv Attariq Aljadid, 25-31 Dec 2010, p6 
xv Attariq Aljadid, 1-7 jan. 
xvi France 24. “ ةرهاظم يف ةمصاعلا رثإ طوقس ليتق يف تاكابتشا عم ةطرشلا برق يديس ديزوب سنوت -  - FRANCE 
24 - Monte Carlo Doualiya”, December 24, 2010. http://www.france24.com/ar/20101224-sidi-bouzid-tunisia-
suicide-menzel-bouzaiane-dead-clashes-police. # ?? ## 
xvii Interview with young secular activists, Tunis (Tunisia), 2011. 
xviii Ibid. 
xix See “ شيجلا يسنوتلا يف راسم‘ ةروث بعشلا ’ - FRANCE 24 - Monte Carlo Doualiya”, January 17, 2011. 
http://www.france24.com/ar/20110117-tunisia-army-revolution-jasmin-ben-ali.
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